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During the second half of the 20th century, sociology
as a social technology in service of the welfare state
has been the predominant form, especially in
Scandinavia. The crisis of the welfare state has led
this form of sociology into a crisis as well. Instead,
I argue for a critical sociology contributing dianostics
of the social pathologies of the modern state. Such an
approach can find inspiration in classical sociology,
but it is also important to realize that, today, we are
living in another modernity. A liberation from social
technology must thus include a liberation from
objectivistic methods.
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1. Introduction
In Alvin Gouldner’s almost-classic stu-
dy of academic sociology from 1970, The
Coming Crisis of Western Sociology, we
find a section titled “A note on the futu-
re of sociology” (Gouldner 1970:443ff).
Gouldner predicts there - in view of the
then rising New Left and psychedelic
culture - the decline of the overwhel-
ming influence of Parsons’ functiona-
lism on post-war American sociology,
and the growing significance of Mar-
xism. He also anticipates the important
role of an expanding welfare state in the
coming crisis of Western sociology. Par-
sonian functionalism cannot, he argues,
adapt to the influences and require-
ments of the welfare state. We should
instead expect the appearance of a kind
of “Keynesian functionalism” and thus
a growth of an instrumental orientation
in sociology.
This growing instrumentalism,
accelerated by the increasing role
of the state, finds its expression
in ‘theoryless’ theories, a kind of
methodological empiricism in
which there is a neglect of sub-
stantive concepts and assump-
tions concerning specifically hu-
man behaviour and social relati-
ons, and a corresponding empha-
sis upon seemingly neutral me-
thods, mathematical models, in-
vestigational techniques, and re-
search technologies of all kinds....
Such a conceptually uncommit-
ted and empty methodological
empiricism is particularly well
adapted to service the research
needs of the Welfare state.
(Gouldner 1970:444-445).
Gouldner describes sociologists of this
kind as “the market researchers of the
welfare state” (Gouldner 1970:445). In
Western Europe and especially Scandi-
navia, however, this was in 1970 not the
future of sociology, it was sociology. In
Germany, Jürgen Habermas had alrea-
dy in 1962 talked about sociology as be-
ing instrumentalised as a “Hilfswissen-
schaft im Dienste von Verwaltungen”
(Habermas 1971:299). In Sweden, socio-
logy had existed primarily as such a
“Hilfswissenschaft” since the discipli-
ne’s institutionalisation soon after the
Second World War (see, for example,
Olsson 1997 and Thörnquist 1997).
However, this kind of sociology is origi-
nally American. As Zygmunt Bauman
once bluntly put it: “The two great bu-
reaucracies in America - the Warfare
and the Welfare bureaucracy - were be-
hind the spectacular development of
empirical sociology” (Bauman 1992:
143). Today, just before the end of the
first whole century of sociology, it is not
especially controversial to claim that the
most influential form of sociology du-
ring the second half of this century has
been what we might call social techno-
logy in service of the welfare state. Du-
ring this time, sociology has to a great
extent been, in Ralf Dahrendorf’s
words, ‘a bureaucratic discipline’ (Dah-
rendorf 1996). Compared to that of soci-
al technology, the influence of the theo-
ries of both Parsons and Marx has been
limited and temporary. This means that
it is wrong to talk about sociology - at
least until quite recently - as multipara-
digmatic or fragmented. It might be
true for social theory, but theory is - at
the most - of secondary importance for
social technology. Most kinds of sociolo-
gies during the second half of the 20th
century - sociology of work, sociology
of addiction, sociology of the family etc.
- did have a common paradigm: social
technology in service of the welfare sta-
te.
It is obvious that the point of depar-
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ture for talking about the future of ‘Wes-
tern sociology’ today must be different
from that of Gouldner’s. From our per-
spective, Gouldner gave too much im-
portance to both Parsons and Marx. Se-
condly, he could not see the coming cri-
sis of the welfare state. Today there can
be no doubt that the welfare state is in
serious trouble, and some even talk
about its end. This situation must of
course be a deadly threat to mainstream
sociology, which has founded its self-
identity and legitimacy on its role as a
servant to this state. It is thus not surpri-
sing when we again not only hear talk
about the coming crisis of sociology, but
also about its ongoing ‘decomposition’
(Horowitz 1993), ‘decline’ (Wagner
1991; Dettling 1996) and ‘end’ (Sennett
1994). My general claim in this article
will be that such statements about the
future of sociology are overreactions to
the present critical situation. If it is true
that the crisis of sociology today is clo-
sely connected to the crisis of the welfa-
re state, then it is not sociology in gene-
ral that faces its end, but sociology as
social technology. A quick look at classic
sociology is enough to show us that so-
ciology in general cannot be reduced to
‘methodological empiricism’ and ‘theo-
ryless theories’.
So if we are not witnessing the end
of sociology, what can be said about its
future? I believe that there are four im-
portant points to be made in connection
with this question.
The first is that we are not necessari-
ly - nor, I will even claim, are we proba-
bly - seeing the end of the welfare state.
What we are seeing is a crisis, that de-
pends primarily on two developments.
(a). The globalisation of market econo-
my has led to an economic crisis in the
nation-bound welfare state. This crisis
does not necessarily imply the end of
the welfare state, but rather its globali-
sation. (b). The welfare state also suffers
from an escalating legitimation crisis.
This state has always been embedded
in a paternalistic form of politics - so-
called social engineering - which is clo-
sely connected to sociology as social
technology. Such politics stand in oppo-
sition to a new form of modernity - in-
cluding, for instance, radicalised indivi-
dualism - which has begun to appear
in the late 20th century. As with the eco-
nomic side of the crisis, the legitima-
tion side might lead us to hasty predic-
tions about the end of the welfare state.
My claim will rather be that the overco-
ming of the legitimation crisis presup-
poses the democratisation of the welfa-
re state, which excludes both politics as
social engineering and social science as
social technology.
The second point is that sociology -
being in the process of losing its most
important foundation for identity for-
mation, that is, the technocratic welfare
state - must once again look back on
classic sociology in order to develop a
new cognitive identity and thus the con-
ditions necessary to abandon the sin-
king ship. I believe that from a critical
theoretical perspective - I am primarily
relying on the Habermas of Theorie des
kommunikativen Handelns (TkH) and Ha-
bermas’ successor in Frankfurt, Axel
Honneth - it is possible to track down
such an identity in classic sociology. It
suggests that sociology should be the
diagnostics of the social pathologies of
modern society. This suggestion would
enable us to develop a sociology which
is not institutionalised as a servant, but
rather as a critic of the welfare state1. I
will argue that such a critical sociology
fit for the 21st century must be able to
free itself from a Marxian philosophy
of history, which classic critical theory
never managed to do, without wander-
ing away to political theory and politi-
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cal philosophy to justify its existence,
which Habermas tends to2.
The third point is - and here I partly
depend on sociologists like Beck, Gid-
dens and Bauman - that the form of mo-
dernity which was the subject of classic
sociology is only one possible form of
modernity. If we use substantial terms
and refer to concrete societies, we
should not speak of modernity but of
modernities. A fundamental trait of mo-
dernity is that incentives to change are
built into its formal structure. This for-
mal structure, however, cannot in itself
supply the material of which concrete
modern societies are made. Every mo-
dern society or culture is therefore mo-
dern in its own special way. Thus, if we
want to investigate current social patho-
logies, we will be dealing with another
modernity than social theory from
Marx to Parsons did. Radicalised globa-
lisation and individualism, which I
mentioned in the first point, are only
two aspects of the emergence of ‘ano-
ther modernity’3.
Unlike the other three, the fourth and
final point does not primarily concern
our changing society and the role which
sociology can or should play there. It
concerns theory of science, that is, the
normative logic of theory development
and empirical research and the relation-
ship of the two. In another sociology (a)
there has to be another relationship be-
tween theory and empirical research
and (b) the methods of empirical re-
search must change.
(a) I agree with Niklas Luhmann that
the one-sided concentration on empiri-
cal methods in post-war sociology has
led to what he calls, with a strange mix-
ture of German and English, a ‘Theorie-
desaster’ (Luhmann 1990:410). Since
Parsons there have not been any - to use
Luhmann’s words again - ‘fachuniver-
salen’ theories (Luhmann 1984:10)4 .
This is probably why many sociology
teachers have been standing more or
less awkwardly silent before students
asking the most elementary question of
them all: What is sociology? I believe
that a science with such a theoretical
weakness is only possible under the
condition of some external force hol-
ding it together - in our case, the dem-
ands of a technocratic welfare state5. So-
ciology is thus today standing at a cross-
road. Either it will manage to develop
some convincing and consistent, albeit
fallible, answers to the question “What
is sociology?”, or sooner or later its cog-
nitive decomposition will be followed
by an institutional one - something
which we already have seen signs of in
the USA (see Horowitz 1993 and Sen-
nett 1994). This problem cannot be sol-
ved without sociological theory deve-
lopment - and I am talking about ‘grand
theory’6.
(b) The reifying methods of sociolo-
gy as social technology fit a special - to
use the early Habermas’ term - ‘interest
of knowledge’, namely the institutiona-
lised interest of the technocratic welfare
state to implement its plans7. Sociology
as the diagnostics of the pathologies of
modern society needs of course to de-
velop other research methods. Current
critical theory has not very much to say
on this point (compare, however, Dry-
zek 1995). We can find in the writings
of Habermas, however, an undeveloped
idea of what might be called communi-
cative research methods.
These four points all need to be wor-
ked out carefully and at length. If this
could be done successfully, the result
would be a program for a future critical
sociology. Of course, I cannot do that
here in this article. I can only give some
further arguments to support and ex-
plain each of the four points. One last
preparatory remark before I start: There
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is a mixture of predictions and prescrip-
tions in my picture of the future of so-
ciology. I am thus working in the same
way that critical theorists usually do.
The distinction between predictions,
which are founded on facts, and pre-
scriptions, which are founded on nor-
mative arguments of different kinds (lo-
gical, moral, ethical, aesthetical), is only
meaningful if it is understood as an ana-
lytical distinction. In actual research
there is never a question of pure facts
or pure normativity. What characterises
critical theory is the idea of a kind of
dialectic between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’
which precludes objectivism, relativism
and utopianism. Normative arguments
are thus seen as situated in facticity,
while factual situations are seen, to so-
me degree, as both a result of normati-
vely motivated action and something
that can be changed by such action - for
instance by critical sociology. Critical
theorists are therefore looking for pos-
sibilities in situations to solve problems
developed in situations. So let us now
turn to the situation of sociology today8.
2. The crisis of the welfare
state and its consequences for
sociology
In introducing the first point I claimed
that the crisis of the welfare state is the
crisis of the (a) nation-bound and (b)
paternalistic welfare state. I will say so-
mething more about both of these sides
of the crisis.
(a) The concept of globalisation is in
the process of becoming the most-dis-
cussed concept in social science today.
Both Beck and Giddens regard globali-
sation as one of the most important
traits of late or - to use their new termi-
nology - ‘second modernity’9. I will not
discuss here the meaning of the concept
of globalisation, or its advantages and
disadvantages. What I want to say is
this: In line with the post-Marxist tradi-
tion of thought, we should regard the
welfare state as the solution to the con-
flict between labour and capital. The
welfare state compensates and protects,
outside the market economy, people
who have no means of production. The
market economy can thus continue to
operate according to its immanent logic,
without necessarily leading to misery
and want for the weak. As long as this
solution can be maintained, the most
important conflicts in society are no lon-
ger economical, but political (see for
instance Habermas 1985b). At a pinch,
the solution can still work as long as
only the production and the circulation
of goods are globalised. When, how-
ever, capital itself is globalised, when
capital liberates itself from a specific
place in space, then the means for the
nation-bound state to protect and com-
pensate the people without means of
production, through taxation and finan-
cial politics in general, is drastically
weakened. The welfare state is then in
crisis.
In a globalised world we continue,
however, to live under conditions of ca-
pitalism. There are still people who pos-
sess means of production and people
who do not. This division does not
change with globalisation, but rather, it
receives global significance. It follows
that if we today are witnessing the end
of the welfare state, then we are also
witnessing the return of the disintegra-
ting conflict between labour and capital.
This conflict is internal to every capitali-
stic society, and thus, every capitalistic
society has to find a solution to it. Now
- and this is the conclusion I want to
reach in this section - under conditions
of globalisation it is very hard to see any
other solution to this conflict than some-
thing like the one - with all its shortco-
mings, failures and mistakes - which we
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see slowly and hesitantly developing in
Europe today, that is, the globalisation
- or perhaps better the transnationalisa-
tion - of the state. I believe that we are
not witnessing the end of the welfare
state but the beginning of its transnatio-
nalisation.
But does it not follow from such an
argument that we must - as soon as a
welfare state has re-established itself on
a transnational level - expect a revival
of sociology as social technology? My
answer would be that this is one of three
possible developments10. Another pos-
sibility is the decline of the welfare state
without any new solution to the conflict
between labour and capital. We could
call such a situation postmodern, and
it would lead to radical social disinte-
gration. A third possible development
would be the emergence of a transnatio-
nal, non-paternalistic welfare state.
What speaks for this second form of
modernity and against the develop-
ment of a paternalistic state on a trans-
national level is that already the natio-
nal paternalistic welfare state (first mo-
dernity) suffers from a legitimation cri-
sis. The globalisation of the welfare state
cannot in itself be a solution to this part
of the crisis. We are here dealing with
another kind of welfare state crisis11.
(b) If we take as our point of depar-
ture Weber’s well-known concept ‘legi-
time Herrschaft’, power presupposes
legitimacy and legitimacy in turn pre-
supposes validity (Weber 1980). In a
modern society, validity has to emerge
under increasingly radicalised condi-
tions of secularisation, pluralism, indi-
vidualism and post-traditionalism. Ra-
dicalised modernity forces us to recon-
struct Weber’s theory of legitimacy.
Such a reconstruction is one of Haber-
mas’ most important sociological ac-
complishments. He argues that if the
political power in a fully modernised
society is not radically democratised, it
is going to suffer from a legitimation cri-
sis (Habermas 1973, 1981, 1992; compa-
re Carleheden 1996:168ff).
I will try to lend some support to
this argument from another angle than
Habermas’ own. In early modernity the
logic of science, technology and the rule
of law (and thus of the bureaucracy) do-
minated politics in a similar way to the
way the logic of religion did in premo-
dern societies. With reference to We-
ber’s famous study Die protestantische
Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus it is
possible to claim that once capitalism
was institutionalised, faith in positive
law, science and technology took over
the legitimating role that the Protestant
ethic had during the emergence of capi-
talism. With the rise of the welfare state,
the importance of this mixture of instru-
mental reason and politics - that is, soci-
al engineering - increased dramatically.
It is in this context that sociology as soci-
al technology emerged. One important
outcome of social engineering is that the
moral dimension of politics also beco-
mes technicalised. Morality then takes
the form of utilitarianism12. In Sweden
there was, in 1997, an intense debate
over one evident example of the negati-
ve consequences of such politics.
In Sweden from 1935 to 1976 over
60,000 persons - more than 90% of them
women - were legally sterilised13.  A
great majority of the sterilisations were
executed by force (Runsic 1998). Most
western countries have, as far as I know,
had sterilisation programs during some
part of the 20th century. But the once-
celebrated Swedish welfare state - the
so-called Swedish model - was probab-
ly, with exception of Nazi Germany, the
most effective also in this case. Eugenics
played a crucial role in these programs.
In Swedish social democratic ideology
- which totally dominated Swedish po-
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litics during the period we are talking
about - the welfare state was called ‘the
home of the people’. The metaphor sug-
gests that the state was understood as
the responsible father and the citizens
his children. In this good and safe home,
every child was taken care of. This
meant, however, that also the less heal-
thy, successful and conscientious child-
ren obtained a level of welfare which
enabled them to have and raise child-
ren. This side effect of welfare politics
was seen as a threat to the future health
of the Swedish race. The ‘bad’ part of
the population bred. This is the back-
ground of the sterilisation program. I
cannot go deeper into this example, but
I see it as a clear example of how a utili-
tarian social policy, relying on medical
science and sociology as social techno-
logy14, with the intention of creating a
good society, created not welfare for all,
but deprivation for some15.
The legitimacy of this kind of politics
presupposes faith in science, social tech-
nology and law. My main point in this
section is that in the late 20th century
we have been witnessing a disenchant-
ment with not only science, but also
technology and positive law. (Castoria-
dis 1995:62; Beck 1986:256)16. Politicians
can no longer just refer to scientific ex-
pertise and reduce politics to a question
of technique. Different kinds of social
movements, civil disobedience and the
general mistrust of politicians illustrate
this new political situation. Democracy
no longer means that we choose our re-
presentatives every fourth year to do
what they want, and otherwise simply
obey them. That would be what Beck
calls ‘democratic monarchy’ (Beck 1986:
312). Radical democracy means partici-
pation and influence of citizens.
Modernity is, to use Hans Blumen-
berg’s term, ‘Kontingenzkultur’ (cited
in Isenberg 1996) - that is, we have lost
every possibility to found anything with
reference to something absolute. It is
precisely this that gives us, however, the
deepest meaning of democracy. Demo-
cracy is, according to Castoriadis, ‘the
rule of self-reflection’ (Castoriadis 1995:
80) and the self-creation of society out
of nothingness. To found society on so-
mething absolute means to found it on
something outside of this social self-
creation (Castoriadis 1995:176). Demo-
cracy is the only legitimate form of this
social, that is, co-operative self-creation
of society. After the disenchantment of
first religion and then positive law,
science and technique, truth cannot
exist outside of the social, and validity
thus depends on the participation of
citizens in the act of societal self-crea-
tion. All this puts much higher dem-
ands on a ‘legitime Herrschaft’ than
Weber had imagined. Under conditions
of second modernity, legitimate power
presupposes radical democracy. This
rules out social engineering and thus
also sociology as social technology.
The conclusion of this first point is
now evident. If there is going to be a
future sociology, it has to detach itself
from the idea of social technology. So-
ciology has to radically and rapidly re-
new itself. This renewal cannot go in
any direction. Another sociology has to
keep pace with the development of se-
cond modernity and not be dragging
behind17.
3. Sociology as diagnostics
of the social pathologies of
modern society
If a renewal of sociology is going to be
worthwhile, there has to be something
in the tradition of sociology that points
beyond social technology and can be
used as point of departure. I agree with
those who claim that already classic so-
ciology was to some extent technocratic.
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However, my argument in this section
only presupposes that classic sociology
as a whole, in contrast to sociology as
social technology, cannot be reduced to
technocratic thinking. There are other
important ideas in classic sociology that
can be used to renew contemporary so-
ciology18. One of these ideas has recent-
ly been made visible by Axel Honneth.
We have to start even further back
than classic sociology. We have to go to
its roots in social philosophy. According
to Honneth, social philosophy must be
distinguished from both moral and po-
litical philosophy. The imperative for
social philosophy is “to find a determi-
nation and discussion of those develop-
mental processes of society that can be
conceived as processes of decline (Fehl-
entwicklungen), distortions, or even as
social pathologies” (Honneth 1994:10,
1996:370). It is clear that such a philoso-
phy demands a normative standard,
and if it is going to be distinct from mo-
ral and political philosophy, that stan-
dard has to be something other than jus-
tice (the right). We need instead a theo-
ry of the good (ethics), that is, of hu-
man self-realisation19. Social philosophy
investigates the social conditions of hu-
man self-realisation. This is clearly an-
other question than the one moral and
political philosophy is working with. It
is not about the meaning of and condi-
tions for just relations between humans,
but about the meaning of and the condi-
tions for becoming a human being. The
conditions we are then talking about are
not biological or psychological condi-
tions, but social conditions. It concerns
social life as a whole.
Honneth sees Rousseau (Discourse on
the Origin of Inequality) as the first so-
cial philosopher. His most important
early followers were Hegel, Marx and
Nietzsche. Social philosophy is thus a
reflection on modern society, a reflec-
tion on the possibilities of self-realisa-
tion after the political, capitalistic and
industrial revolutions. Its central ques-
tion is what consequences the legalisa-
tion, commercialisation and industriali-
sation of social relations have for the
possibility of human self-realisation. In
this pre-sociological phase of social re-
flection we find primarily two different
forms of normative foundation, based
on either philosophical anthropology or
a philosophy of history. Both orienta-
tions form the basis for a criticism of
modern society as - at least from the
perspective of human self-realisation -
a process of decline. The general claim
is that modernity in some sense is a hin-
drance to human self-realisation or even
makes it impossible.
According to Rousseau, the process
of civilisation forces man to abandon his
natural way of life. Honneth notices that
Rousseau turns Hobbes upside down.
It is the state of nature which allows hu-
man self-realisation and the state of ci-
vil society which prevents it. Already
in the works of Rousseau we find one
of the most important ideas of social
philosophy, alienation. The conditions
of modernity alienate man from him-
self, from his natural form of life. The
consequence is both a ‘loss of freedom’
and a ‘loss of virtues’ - examples of so-
cial pathology.
In Hegel’s work, another social pa-
thology is central, ‘loss of community’.
According to Hegel, the development
of modern subjective rights leads to so-
cial isolation. This in turn prevents self-
realisation, because he - in contrast to
Rousseau - sees non-instrumental social
relations as conditions for a fully hu-
man life (compare contemporary com-
munitarianism). Hegel claims that some
kind of social unity, which would con-
nect atomistic bourgeois life, is needed.
In Marx’s early work, self-determined
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work is the condition for self-realisa-
tion. Capitalistic and industrial forms
of division of labour prevent this. The
result is alienation. In the later Marx,
the idea of reification has replaced alie-
nation. Reification has since become a
more powerful concept than alienation
because, unlike the latter, it is not bound
to a romantic idea of work.
Nietzsche, in contrast to Marx, con-
centrates on the cultural conditions of
modernity. Modernity makes it impos-
sible, he claims, to live according to va-
lues which are conditions for self-reali-
sation. He sees nihilism - ‘loss of mea-
ning’ - as the most important form of
modern pathology.
My intention is only to remind you
of these social philosophers and their
well-known ideas. The important point
for my argument is that these ways of
thinking had a big influence on the
founding fathers of sociology. In a way,
classic sociology can be described as so-
cial philosophy transformed into scien-
ce. The founding fathers of sociology,
Honneth writes -
were without exception deeply
convinced that modern society
was threatened by a moral impo-
tence, which necessarily led to
massive disturbances in social re-
production. With the institutio-
nal transition from a traditional
to a modern social order, so
claimed the general diagnosis,
the social value structure had lost
that ethical power of formation
which had up until now allowed
the individual to interpret its life
as meaningful relative to a social
aim. Sociology could now be con-
ceived as an answer to the resul-
ting pathology .... (Honneth 1996:
380, 1994:29).
This statement is easy to support. Just
think about Weber’s theory of moderni-
sation as rationalisation which leads to
a general disenchantment of the world.
Weber conceptualises modernity as a
loss of both freedom and meaning and
talks about modernity as an iron cage.
Think about Durkheim’s central con-
cept of anomie. Think about Simmel’s
talk about modernity as the ‘tragedy of
culture’. Think about Tönnies’ worries
about what social bounds keep modern
society together, etc. The influence of
Rousseau, Hegel, Marx and Nietzsche
on the founding fathers of sociology is
also a well-known story. I hope it is
enough just to mention these central
concepts of classic sociology to support
the thesis that sociology was - at least
in part - a normative and critical scien-
ce. I believe that it is precisely this part
which made sociology an interesting
and exciting science, that is, precisely
the part which is the first victim of so-
ciology as social technology. Even more
importantly, sociology as social techno-
logy does not only neglect social patho-
logies, it takes part in the production of
such pathologies20.
Classic sociology was different from
the one which has dominated the se-
cond half of the 20th century. It seems
even possible to find support for a criti-
cal sociology in classic sociology. One
of the main problems with such a socio-
logy is, however, the validity of the nor-
mative standards which are the point
of departure for the criticism. As I men-
tioned earlier, pre-sociological social
philosophy depended either on philoso-
phical anthropology or a philosophy of
history. Both these forms seem today to
be undermined by the philosophical cri-
ticism of metaphysics. It is, however, es-
sential for an advocacy of sociology as
diagnostics of the social pathologies of
modern society, that distinctions be-
64
tween pathological and non-pathologi-
cal life forms can be made in a non-arbi-
trary way. Such a sociology must, in ot-
her words, be able to answer the diffi-
cult question of how it is at all possible
to defend normative standards of what
a good or successful life is21. The classic
sociologists never solved this problem,
which explains why it was so important
for them to try to develop ‘scientific’
research methods, and why the norma-
tive part of classic sociology was often
implicit or even concealed.
I agree with Honneth that the only
way to solve this problem is to leave
the substantial approach of social philo-
sophy behind and develop a formal
theory of the good (compare Carlehe-
den 1996: chap. 8). However, in compa-
rison with Aristotelian ethics, Rous-
seau’s social philosophy is already a for-
malisation. Rousseau did not speak
about the goals of human self-realisa-
tion, but about the conditions for its
possibility. He did, however, use a nor-
mative concept of nature similarly to
the way theories of natural rights do.
Such references to human nature are
just as problematic as Hegelian ideas
of an immanent logic in history, in
which an anticipated end-state is used
as normative foundation. In the article
by Honneth which I have been referring
to, he does not really help us much fur-
ther than stating our problem very
clearly. He ends by saying that the ap-
proach he has developed “depends on
the success with which the claims of a
weak formalistic anthropology may be
justified in the future” (Honneth 1996:
394, 1994:60). Let us see if Habermas
can help us further.
Habermas criticises the early critical
theory because, although its members
knew that a philosophy of history can-
not be defended, they never worked out
another normative foundation for their
critique of modern society. Habermas
claims to have found such a foundation
in the formal structures of linguistic
communication. In the second volume
of TkH he explains the social pathologi-
es of modern society as resulting from
disturbances of the symbolic reproduc-
tion of the lifeworld. Symbolic repro-
duction depends, Habermas continues,
on communicative action. Through this
form of speech act, meaning, social inte-
gration and personal identity are pro-
duced. Without it, human life cannot be
upheld22. The general characteristic of
the human being is its ability to commu-
nicate. Communication is a universal
condition for human life. As for early
critical theory reification is the most im-
portant kind of social pathology for Ha-
bermas. In his theory, reification means
that communicative action is made im-
possible. Reification is here translated
to the well-known thesis about the co-
lonisation of the lifeworld by the system
(see Carleheden 1996: chap. 2).
It is thus evident that Honneth in
many ways relies on Habermas. His ar-
gument is a continuation of critical theo-
ry. However, in TkH, Habermas does
not relate social pathology, as Honneth
does, to human self-realisation in any
direct way23. After TkH, he furthermore
concentrates his efforts on moral and
political philosophy, on political science
and law. Eventually he does develop a
beginning of a theory of self-realisation.
Self-realisation is then seen as the crite-
ria of the good (ethics) in contrast to the
right (justice and morality). In this ap-
proach, however, self-realisation still
isn’t connected with a theory of social
pathology. Self-realisation is either un-
derstood existentially (the self-realisa-
tion of a person) or politically (the self-
realisation of a group or community of
some kind)24. As a matter of fact, no-
where in Habermas’ work can we find
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social philosophy in Honneth’s sense,
that is, a combination of the concepts
of self-realisation and social pathology.
The advantage of this combination is -
as I see it - its ability to give sociology a
normative point of departure of its own.
Habermas’ theory of communication is
too general for our purposes. Let me
give some arguments for this claim be-
fore we go on.
In TkH, sociology plays a very im-
portant role for the critical theory of so-
ciety because in it we have, Habermas
claims, a social science which is inter-
nally related to questions about rationa-
lity and validity. The argument seems
to be, that if we can reflect on such que-
stions within the framework of a scien-
ce, then we can work out a theory of
normative foundation without expo-
sing ourselves to the criticism of meta-
physics, which otherwise seems to un-
dermine all forms of critical thinking.
Normativity is, according to Habermas,
inherent in key sociological concepts li-
ke social action and social order. The
basic theme of sociology is, he claims,
social integration (TkH vol.1: 19, Eng.
vol.1: 4). However, in the works after
TkH it becomes increasingly clear that
the normative foundation of a modern
society’s social integration is to be
worked out by a theory of the right. A
theory of the good can only play a mi-
nor role. In Faktizität und Geltung (FG),
political science and jurisprudence
seem to have taken over the key role
that sociology played in TkH25. I believe
this is mistaken. I think it is true that
sociology cannot claim to be the meta-
science of the social sciences, but neither
can political science or law. The good
and the right are equally important
concepts for social science. The one
cannot be reduced to the other. Both the
logic of justice and of human self-reali-
sation pose fundamental demands on
society as a whole, and these two de-
mands need not - and should not - stand
in contradiction of each other, as the de-
bate between liberals and communita-
rians might suggest26.
The problem with Habermas’ criti-
cal theory from a sociological point of
view is that his concept of the good is
too weak. It cannot give sociology a nor-
mative foundation of its own. I agree
with the general claim in his later theory
of self-realisation, that the procedural
presuppositions of practical discourse
about both the good and the right are
similary universal. The problem lies in
his way of distinguishing the good from
the right. Like Rawls, Habermas argues
that while human rights are characteri-
sed by being generalisable, conceptions
of the good are thoroughly contextual.
But if we do not develop a formal theo-
ry of the general characteristics of the
good, self-realisation could be anything.
This means that a practical discourse
about the good immediately must be
caught up by relativism. We thus need
a theory of human self-realisation. Just
an application of discourse theory is not
enough. The difference between a theo-
ry of the right and a theory of the good
cannot be how far their normative con-
ceptions can be generalised. It is rather
a question of different kinds of normati-
vity.
The perhaps somewhat surprising
conclusion of this quick look into the
work of Habermas is that he does not
really give us the theoretical material
we need to formulate a conception of a
critical sociology. He formulates a gene-
ral framework for a critical theory of
society, but he does not give sociology
- as a distinct discipline - a clear and
consistent role within this general fra-
mework. Social integration seems to
have become a subject matter for politi-
cal science, law and political theory, and
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the concept of communicative action or
discourse is too general for our purpo-
ses. We are thus back where we left
Honneth. Luckily he, in a earlier book
called Kampf um Annerkenung, has gone
a bit further than in the article I referred
to previously.
Honneth’s purpose in this book is
precisely to work out “the universals
of a successful (gelungenen) life” (Hon-
neth 1992:285). Such a theory, he writes,
must be formal enough not to violate
the plurality of concrete forms of life.
On the other hand, it must be able to
offer more than a theory of justice.
Honneth starts - with the help of He-
gel and Mead (and tacitly, Habermas) -
by making a distinction between self-
preservation and recognition. Economic
and political theories in the tradition of
Machiavelli and Hobbes always have
self-preservation as their fundamental
point of departure. Recognition, how-
ever, has in its primary sense nothing
to do with self-preservation. While self-
preservation concerns physical survi-
val, recognition takes place in the sym-
bolic and social dimension of life; it is
intersubjective. This means also that
Honneth takes Hegel’s part against
Rousseau. With his general critique of
civilisation, Rousseau argues that hu-
man self-realisation is a monological
self-relationship. Hegel and Mead see
instead a special kind of non-instrumen-
tal social relation as fundamental to be-
coming a human being. Self-realisation
presupposes intersubjective recogni-
tion. Human beings are social beings,
which explains why ‘loss of communi-
ty’ and ‘anomie’ must be seen as social
pathologies. I believe that with this as-
sertion something other is said than
what can be said with the help of mo-
ral and political theory, that is, with con-
cepts like freedom, autonomy, respect
and justice. We are dealing with two dif-
ferent kinds of normativity. Human be-
ings need recognition just as much as
justice.
Honneth does not, however, confine
himself to a general concept of recogni-
tion. He differentiates between three
forms of recognition which a good life
presupposes: Love, rights and solidari-
ty27. In the first case recognition is ex-
pressed through emotional devotion
(Zuwendung), in the second case
through cognitive respect and in the
third case through social esteem (Wert-
schätzung) (Honneth 1992:211). These
forms of recognition corresponds fur-
ther to three forms of disrespect (Miß-
achtung). Such distinctions could be
used as points of departure for working
out the different tasks and fields of a
critical sociology. Another way would
be to take the different models of social
pathologies in classic sociology - aliena-
tion, reification, anomie, loss of mea-
ning, loss of freedom and loss of com-
munity etc. - as points of departure. I
cannot, however, go further into this
matter here.
To conclude this point, the concept
of ‘intersubjective recognition’ seems to
be what we have been looking for. It is
the core of a weak formalistic anthropo-
logy that can be defended against the
relativist critique of universals, because
it is - as Habermas’ concept of commu-
nication is - not just philosophical, but
can rely on social theories (like Mead’s),
and it is formal enough to allow for a
plurality of life forms. In addition, it is
more substantial than the theory of dis-
course and distinct from a theory of ju-
stice. It gives us thus a normative foun-
dation for sociology as diagnostics of
the pathologies of modern society.
4. Another modernity
My third point is that it is wrong to
speak of the modern society in the sin-
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gular. This mistake is made on both si-
des of the modernity-postmodernity
debate. The mistake lies in identifying
the first concrete form of modernity
with modernity in general. Contempo-
rary society cannot be understood in
this way, because it is neither a simple
continuation of first modernity nor so-
mething quite different. Sociology
should instead be a study of moderniti-
es. This is a more concrete task than just
writing the history of the emergence of
modernity’s general features. Further-
more, we wouldn’t be forced to under-
stand modernity as something in the
process of freeing itself from all pre-mo-
dern elements. Such an understanding
might allow us to speak of modernities,
but only in the sense of more and less
pure stages. It implies that the history
of modernity is going to end in one glo-
bal form of pure modernity. Instead so-
ciology as a study of modernities sug-
gests that modernity is going to produ-
ce different kinds of modern societies,
for instance a second Western form of
modernity. This form is not purer that
the classic Western form or, for instance,
some Eastern form of modernity - it is
only different (compare Taylor 1995: xi-
xii). Let me give some examples to sup-
port this claim.
In the first point I mentioned globali-
sation. In many ways, globalisation is
only a continuation of trends in classic
modernity. It is for instance by no means
a break with capitalism. However, one
of the main characteristics of a society
in the period of classic modernity was
that it could more or less be equated
with a nation state society. Today, glo-
balisation has gone so far that it in many
ways stands in opposition to the nation
state. With continued globalisation, we
should expect that societies with bor-
ders other than national ones are going
to be more important to modern peop-
le’s lives than nation state societies 28 .
Such societies are thus different from
societies of classic modernity, but they
can still very well build on typically mo-
dern qualities such as individualism,
pluralism, secularisation etc. Individua-
lisation can also be used to support my
argument. An individualistic self-un-
derstanding - which for instance was
expressed in the American and French
revolutions - was one of the most im-
portant features of classic modernity.
But just as in the case of globalisation,
things start to happen when individua-
lism becomes radicalised. We are dea-
ling with changes in degree which at a
certain level become changes in kind.
One side of this is the legitimation crisis
I talked about in the first point. The ra-
dicalised individualistic self-understan-
ding threatens not only the paternalis-
tic and technocratic welfare state, but
also representative democracy as we
know it. Another side of this radicalised
individualism is the consequences it has
for the paternalistic family (Beck 1986).
Beck has argued that while the family
in many ways was the smallest unit of
classic modernity, we are now entering
a period where the family is replaced
by the individual. This development
can easily be confirmed by looking at
increasing divorce rates and the increa-
sing number of people living alone.
Other examples of the development of
another modernity are post-industrial
capitalism, multiculturalism, the chan-
ge from more instrumental to more
aesthetical forms of life (Schulze 1992),
the disappearance of class as a kind of
‘Gemeinschaft’ (Beck 1986).
Now, it would not be surprising if
the writings of classic social philoso-
phers and sociologists are bound to a
great degree to the specific case of clas-
sic modernity. Obviously, the kind of
work Marx was criticising when he
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wrote about alienation is different from
the kind we find in a post-industrial so-
ciety. Clearly Weber had very little expe-
rience of the possibilities of radical de-
mocracy when he wrote about moderni-
ty as an iron cage. Hegel or Durkheim
could not reflect on the declining impor-
tance of nation, class or family when
they wrote about loss of community,
anomie and social integration. Weber
did not know about the increasing pos-
sibilities for aesthetic forms of life as a
response to secularisation and loss of
meaning etc. When another sociology
uses the concept of social pathology and
takes as its point of departure classic
sociology, it will have to take into ac-
count how the development of another
modernity changes the content and the
conditions of social pathologies in con-
temporary society.
5. In search of non-reifying
empirical methods
Critical theorists have over and over
again pointed out that the empirical me-
thods of mainstream sociology are clo-
sely connected to an objectivistic world
view and well suited to a technocratic
society (see for instance Adorno et al.
1972). Thus a critical sociology has to
develop another methodology, which
will also overcome the idea of a dualis-
tic relationship between theoretical and
empirical research29. This is the back-
ground for the last point I want to make.
To be able to outline another metho-
dology we have to be very careful, be-
cause the objectivism of ‘scientific’ em-
pirical research is as old as the discipline
itself. There are few non-objectivist at-
tempts in the sociological tradition to
fall back on30. This results from the un-
fortunate idea that the social sciences
should copy the methods of the natural
sciences in order to gain the status of a
‘real’ science. Our problem, however,
goes even deeper. The objectivistic un-
derstanding of knowledge in general
has dominated epistemology and the
theory of science ever since Descartes.
This is true to such a degree that critics
of objectivism often see themselves for-
ced to do away with methodology and
epistemology altogether31. One reason
for this is that epistemology seems to
be inevitably intertwined with a dualis-
tic understanding of the relationship be-
tween the scientist and the world which
he or she is seeking knowledge about.
The relation is thus construed as a sub-
ject-object relation. Objectification of the
world and its inhabitants becomes in
this view a precondition of knowledge.
Today - after the pioneering work of
Heidegger and the later Wittgenstein -
it is quite clear that epistemology in this
sense is not just a theory of knowledge,
but that it implies a whole world view
- a deceptive one. Charles Taylor men-
tions three often-criticised notions rela-
ted to epistemology (Taylor 1995:7):
1. The possibility of a free and ratio-
nal subject outside of both the na-
tural and the social world.
2. An instrumental relation between
subject and object.
3. An atomistic understanding of so-
ciety.
The first notion follows from the con-
ception of knowledge as representation,
that is, the idea that knowledge is the
subject’s inner pictures of an outer rea-
lity. Here we once again encounter the
early modern idea that science should
and could take over the position that
God had in the pre-modern world, that
is, a position from above, from where
it is possible to observe the world as
something disparate and external. The
critics of epistemology have, however,
convincingly argued that the scientist
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is rather a product of the same world
that he or she is studying. Rather than
he or she being here and the world the-
re, the scientist is a ‘being-in-the-world’,
to use Heidegger’s terminology.
The second notion follows from the
first. A subject outside the world can
only relate to it in an instrumental way,
that is, treat it as a physical object. This
includes the subject’s relation to its own
body and to every other subject.
The third notion is this epistemologi-
cal world view applied to social theo-
ry32. The last two notions explain why
this kind of epistemology fits a techno-
cratic society so well. I cannot here,
however, go further into the by-now,
even without including critical theory,
overwhelming criticism of these notions
- from Heidegger’s concept of ‘being-
in-the-world’ and the later Wittgen-
stein’s concept of ‘language-game’ to
Kuhn’s paradigm theory of science and
postmodern criticism of the autono-
mous subject. The notions have been
disputed on an anthropological, moral,
political, sociological, historical and lo-
gical level. Let me instead try to say so-
mething about the theoretical condi-
tions of another methodology.
The fact that scientists no longer can
be seen as gods, but as human beings
living in a natural and social world,
means - at least in the case of social
science - that they lose their privileged
position in relation to their objects of
research. It may seem strange that I
need to emphasise this, but in view of
the history of methodology it is not. So-
cial scientists are not another kind of
people and scientific methods are not
magic flutes. Their knowledge and their
methods do not differ in kind from the
knowledge of other people and their
‘methods’. Normal people can in fact
acquire knowledge and reflect upon
themselves without scientific methods
and a grade in statistics or formal logic.
Scientists are influenced, just as are nor-
mal people, by the fact that they are si-
tuated in a specific social and historic
context with specific values and beliefs.
If they were not, they would not be able
to know anything at all.
Another consequence of the critique
of epistemology points in the same di-
rection. Along with the idea of know-
ledge as representation, we have to lea-
ve the correspondence theory of truth
behind (Habermas 1997). It is impossib-
le to compare inner pictures or concepts
with an outer world. Such a comparison
would presuppose some kind of pure
contact with this world which is not
mediated through inner pictures or
concepts. This is as unconvincing as the
idea that the outer world, through per-
ception, causes true inner pictures of
this world, as long as the observation
is made in the right way. It is more
convincing to argue that every contact
with an outer world must be mediated
or interpreted through language.
Knowledge of something presupposes
that this something can be placed in a
symbolic universe or - to use Wittgen-
stein’s terminology - become a part of
a language game33. Such a language ga-
me could for instance be a social theory,
which shows why theory is crucial to
empirical research. Wittgenstein, how-
ever, goes further. He understands lan-
guage in a performative way, which
leads him to see a language game as a
form of life. Language is a way of acting
and living that includes, of course, per-
formative knowledge34 . Thus, living
and acting people always already have
knowledge, which is not different in
kind from scientific knowledge. Objec-
tivistic science is, in a way, just another
language game. It implies, however, a
technocratic form of life.
We can use the theory of language
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game as a theory of knowledge. It says
that to know something is to place this
something in an already existing sym-
bolic universe. Of course new knowled-
ge can change this universe to some ex-
tent, but some pre-existing symbolic
universe is a necessary precondition for
knowledge. To place something in a
symbolic universe is to interpret it. Hu-
man beings - that is, both scientists and
normal people - are, to use Taylor’s
phrase, ‘interpreting animals’ (Taylor
1985:45ff).
We are now prepared to take a look
at the methodological considerations
which are to be found in Habermas’
writings 35. The term ‘social’ means a re-
lationship between at least two human
beings. Habermas’ theory of communi-
cative action says that this relation can-
not be understood in its primary sense
as a subject-object relation. In accordan-
ce with what has just been argued, if
we understand the scientist as a human
being, social science also has to be un-
derstood as a social relation. Habermas
can accordingly use his findings in so-
cial theory to develop a methodology.
The relation between the scientist and
the inhabitants of the social world that
he or she is examining cannot primarily
be a subject-object relationship. It is on
a fundamental level, like all other so-
cial relations, a subject-subject relation,
an intersubjective relation. The reason
for this lies in the logic of understand-
ing. To be able to understand the mean-
ing of another subject’s actions (includ-
ing speech acts), we have to have ac-
cess to this person’s symbolic universe,
a universe which to a great extent is
shared with other people living in the
same society.
Now in the case of sociology this is
not so hard as it sounds, because socio-
logists mostly study their own society,
that is, a language game/form of life
(or lifeworld) which the sociologists
and their objects of research already to
a great extent share. In comparison to
social anthropologists, sociologists in
this respect have an easier task. In prin-
ciple, however, they have to solve the
same problem (a problem scientists
share with normal people), the problem
of mutual understanding. Access to an-
other person’s symbolic universe pre-
supposes a process of reaching mutual
understanding (‘Verständigung’). Such
a understanding is not possible if we
treat our objects of research as pure ob-
jects. The process of mutual understan-
ding presupposes that we meet the oth-
er as another subject, that is, as a per-
son with intentions of his/her own. To
explain this in detail would take too
much time, unfortunately. The crucial
claim to make here is Habermas’ argu-
ment for a necessary connection be-
tween meaning and validity. We cannot
understand meaning, he asserts, with-
out taking a position on the rightness
of certain validity claims which are in-
volved in every speech act (primarily
claims about truth and normative right-
ness). Thus a social scientist cannot treat
the claims inherent in the speech acts
of the inhabitants of the social world
he or she is studying as mere facts, so
long as he or she wants to understand
them. A process of reaching mutual un-
derstanding can only begin if the per-
sons involved take positions towards
the validity claims of one another. This
is only possible if scientists abandon -
at least for a while - their lonely posi-
tions as observers and take the positions
of participants.
If a process of reaching mutual un-
derstanding does not precede the con-
struction of social facts, this construc-
tion is only going to be the result of the
scientist’s personal symbolic universe,
that is, it is going to be subjective. In
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this case the scientist lacks access to the
symbolic dimension of the social world
he or she is studying. The meaning he
or she attributes to the actions of the
inhabitants of this world can therefore
only be the scientist’s own subjective
meaning. This is what happens in the
case of objectivistic science. In using ob-
jectivistic methods, social scientists for-
ce the objectivistic world view implied
by these methods on the society they
are studying. Objectivism thus turns
out to be a form of subjectivism.
The question which emerges at this
stage is whether or not there is any dif-
ference between the scientist and the
normal person at all. The answer is that
a scientist cannot be a participant all the
time. This is of course also true for the
normal person. We must all be able to
take the position of a third person obser-
ving other people interact. The social
scientist, however, specialises in such
observation. The social scientist is an ex-
pert at observing some specific part of
the social world. He or she collects ob-
servations in a systematic way and tries
to find connections between them with
the help of social theory. A scientist is
an expert at producing specialised
knowledge, similar to the way someone
may be an expert at doing business on
the stock market, playing football or re-
pairing old cars. Habermas tries to cap-
ture the special form of the social scien-
tist’s expertise with the phrase ‘virtual
participant’. In contrast to normal peop-
le, the social scientist does not “pursue
any aims of his own within the observed
context” (TkH Vol.1:168, Eng. Vol.1: 14).
For normal people, knowledge is first
and foremost the ‘instruments’ of living
and acting. Even a critical sociologist
can be distinguished from normal peop-
le through his or her theoretical attitude
towards knowledge.
I cannot here develop these prepara-
tory remarks about the preconditions
for non-reifying methods further. Per-
haps we could call them communicati-
ve research methods. The problem with
such methods is that they could be cri-
ticised for hermeneutic idealism similar
to the way Habermas criticises interpre-
tative sociology in general (TkH vol.2:
182ff, Eng. vol.2:119ff). It is at this point
that he introduces systems theory. Peop-
le’s actions cannot always be explained
by their intentions and motives, not
even after a process of mutual under-
standing. Society is not only lifeworld.
But Habermas makes these points only
on a social-theoretical level. Which are
the consequences for methodology?
Habermas does not ask himself this
question36. It is obvious that external
forces - and we do not have to under-
stand them in a system-theoretical way
- do play an important role in society. It
is also obvious that such external for-
ces might be responsible for social pa-
thologies. Such is the claim of Haber-
mas’ theory of colonisation. The ques-
tion then is how sociology can grasp
these forces in empirical research and
how methods for this are to be related
to communicative methods. This ques-
tion I have to leave open without even
a single preparatory remark.
Noter
1. I am not primarily talking about a critique
of the welfare state as such, but rather a criti-
que of what the welfare state does and how it
works. The welfare state should, however, on-
ly be seen as one, although one of the most
important, possible objects of critique. Anoth-
er important object is of course the market and
its consequences for social life.
2. I am using the term ‘critical theory’ as a more
general term than ‘critical sociology’. The for-
mer term is synonymous with ‘the Frankfurt
school’ and is a perspective which can be used
in the social sciences and the humanities in
general.
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3. ‘Another modernity’, and not ‘New moder-
nity’, is the correct English translation of the
subtitle to Beck’s book Risikogesellschaft (1986).
4. The only exception, besides Luhmann’s own
systems theory, is Habermas’ theory of com-
municative action.
5. Such a hypothesis could explain why Ame-
rican sociology today seems to be in a weaker
position than European sociology (see Horo-
witz (1993) and Sennett (1994)). The welfare
state is, after all, more developed in Europe
than in the USA.
6. An answer to the question “What is socio-
logy?” does of course not exclude theoretical
pluralism. Theoretical pluralism presupposes
rather several competing answers to this ques-
tion.
7. It is possible to say a lot about the special
logic of this implementation without using the
mystifying language of Luhmann’s systems
theory. I believe Habermas goes too far in Luh-
mann’s direction, but I cannot develop that he-
re.
8. There are several contemporary attempts to
develop a ‘post-empiricist’ or ‘post-positivist’
sociology, which do not take their point of de-
parture in critical theory. For an account, see
for instance Bryant (1995) or Pleasants (1997).
I cannot explicitly challenge these alternatives
to my own attempt here.
9. See the recently started Suhrkamp book se-
ries edited by Beck called ‘Edition Zweite Mo-
derne’.
10. There are already today undeniable signs
of a technocratic approach in European re-
search politics.
11. This is what makes me more optimistic
than Dahrendorf (1997), who believes that glo-
balisation is going to make the 21st century
an ‘authoritarian century’.
12. This corresponds to Gouldner’s term
‘Keynsian functionalism’. The aim of social en-
gineering is the survival of society as a whole.
13. A majority of the sterilisations were exe-
cuted before 1955 (Runcis 1998).
14. Two of the most important Swedish social
democratic ‘legislators’ - to use Bauman’s con-
cept (1987) - Alva and Gunnar Myrdal - did a
lot of their most important work before so-
ciology was institutionalised in Sweden. They
were, however, to a great extent inspired by
American sociology and even sometimes cal-
led themselves sociologists. Gunnar Myrdal
(1954:191ff) named his political program “a
technology of economies”. See Nilsson (1994).
15. Swedish media was, in 1997, full of inter-
views with mostly elderly women who tear-
fully tell stories about how their lives were de-
stroyed because of sterilisation, and how they
until now had told almost nobody about the
true cause of their childlessness because they
were ashamed of it. These repeated stories
about shame show how strong the technocra-
tic welfare state ideology once was.
16. These two authors do not mention positi-
ve law. I see faith in positive law as at least as
important for an understanding of cmassic
modernity as faith in science and technology.
We can use Weber’s theory of legitimacy to ar-
gue for this.
17. However, such a renewal might not neces-
sarily imply a complete disconnection of social
research and politics. Giddens suggests in-
stead a new model, which he calls dialogical:
“A dialogical model introduces the notion that
the most effective forms of connection be-
tween social research and policy-making are
forged through an extended process of com-
munication between researchers, policy-ma-
kers and those affected by whatever issues are
under consideration.” (Giddens 1987:44). See
also Bryant (1995: chap. 5).
18. In criticising an earlier version of this artic-
le, Bauman writes: “To encompass the logic
of all sociology (...) one needs to take enlighten-
ment and not service as a frame. I believe that
the story would look then much less disconti-
nuous ...” (personal correspondence, January
30, 1998). This criticism made me change some
earlier formulations.
19. Concerning the distinction between the
right and the good, see Rawls (1993) or Ha-
bermas (1991, 1992).
20. Compare Wagner (1991:14), who writes:
“While the classic social sciences tried to unco-
ver the institutional structures which threate-
ned to discipline the individual and undermi-
ne his autonomy, the modern social sciences
reified exactly these structures and became
therefore rather one more bar in the ‘iron cage
of modernity’ instead of becoming the instru-
ment to break this cage open.”
21. It is problematic enough to claim univer-
sal validity for concepts of what is morally
right.
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22. We are here actually dealing with a weak
formal anthropology. In TkH (vol.2:561f, Eng.
vol.2:383), even Habermas sometimes talks
about “anthropologically deep-seated struc-
tures” with reference to communicative ac-
tion.
23. Habermas does in TkH use the concept of
authenticity a few times, but there he relates
it to aesthetics. This approach is already aban-
doned in Habermas (1985a). Compare Carle-
heden (1996:231ff).
24. The first way is developed in Habermas
(1991:100ff), the second in Habermas (1992).
25. The role of sociology in FG seems primarily
to be a correction of purely normative approa-
ches (like Rawls’), that is, the role of a ‘objecti-
vistic disenchanter’ (like Luhmann).
26. It seems to me that while Habermas - like
liberals - tends to let the concept of the right
overrule the concept of the good, Honneth -
like communitarians - tends to let the concept
of the good overrule the concept of the right. I
am critical of both the approaches.
27. Instead of seeing the good and the right as
two different and equally important normati-
ve concepts, Honneth thus in a communitarian
manner understands the right as a part of the
good. In Carleheden (1996:234ff), I argue that
even from the perspective of self-realisation,
we need to develop a concept of morality that
in a way supports a concept of the right, which
is developed from the perspective of justice.
In contrast to Honneth, however, I believe that
such an idea of the moral aspect of the good
can only support - not replace - a Kantian, de-
ontological theory of the right.
28. It is often observed that globalisation does
not exclude decentralisation. There seem to be
better possibilities for regional and local com-
munities in a globalised world than in a na-
tion state.
29. This dualistic idea we find just as much in
‘qualitative’ as in ‘quantitative’ empirical re-
search.
30. Compare, however, the so-called interpre-
tative sociology.
31. Compare post-positivistic relativism and
postmodern contextualism (Rorty), but also
for instance Gadamer (1986) who argues that
we have to choose between truth and method
or Taylor (1995), who talks about ‘overcoming
epistemology’.
32. Hobbes’ social theory is the first clear
example.
33. This concept should be understood in con-
trast to a physical universe. We should remem-
ber that Wittgenstein emphasises that such a
universe cannot be private.
34. Habermas uses Husserl’s term ‘lifeworld’
in a similar sense.
35. Habermas himself rejects his methodolo-
gically and epistemologically oriented theo-
ries before TkH (see Habermas 1982:10). Since
then, however, he has had little to say about
methodological questions. We have only
section 4 of the introduction to TkH (vol.1:
152ff, Eng. vol.1:102ff) and an article included
in Habermas (1983:29ff), which to some extent
only repeats the arguments in TkH, to rely on.
36. He does have things to say about this in
his earlier period of thinking (Habermas 1968,
1982:313ff). But this was when he used Freud’s
theory as a model for the social sciences, and
these ideas cannot easily be used in connection
with his later period.
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